

The five forces of private equity?

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Zurich, July 5th 2017 – SECA

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17 years of experience in private markets (USA, France, LatAm., Switz.)

- Research: Executive director in charge of private markets at UBS CIO
- Investments: venture capital fund manager, former CIO of Tiaré Investment Management AG
- Advisor to the President of CASDEN-Banque Populaire, a Swiss pension fund and MFO
- Expert for SECA, AFIC, InvestEurope and CAIA

Five books on private equity, among which:

- *Introduction to private equity*, Wiley, 2013, 2nd ed. (translated in Portuguese, Spanish and Mandarin)
- *Private equity fund investments*, Palgrave, 2015



Agenda

Five private equity forces and their consequences

- 'Gravity' - a continuing attractiveness
- 'Black holes' - the herding effect
- 'Entropy' - being different to succeed
- 'Liquidity' - the third dimension of investing
- 'Entanglement' - regulatory threat and opportunity



The gravitational pull of private equity


A continuing attractiveness



Growth of assets under management

Result from new entrants, increase of asset base and allocations to PE

Evolution of uninvested capital and value of portfolios




- Ratio dry powder/unr. value decreased: 90% (2000-05) to 46% (2011-16)
- Growth of AuM: 21% (dry powder: +15%, unrealized value: +25%)
- ➔ At first approach, no reason to be alarmed by dry powder levels (**but funds only**)
- ➔ However, potential overheating of certain market segments



Figures are in USD bn. Data until June 2016. Source: Preqin, Wellershoff & Partners 2017.

Increase in allocations to private equity

Compared evolution of S&P500 and investors intentions as for private equity allocation




- Allocations rely on 'wealth effects':
 - Correlation of 0.79 between the progression of the S&P500 and the sentiment
 - Sensitiveness to denominator effect
- Transition from modern portfolio theory to factor-based asset allocation could lead to increased allocations to PE



Note: sentiment is the weighted average of intentions. 2011 = 100. Source: Preqin (2017), Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Wellershoff & Partners.

The gravitational pull of private equity

Evolution of assets managed by private equity funds



- Estimates: funds' assets under management only (est. +25% for co-inv.)
- Increase (25x) due to:
 - **Thirst for yield**
 - **New entrants**
 - Overall **growth of assets managed** and **threshold effects**
 - **Increase in allocations** to PE and SAA **switch to factor-based investing**



Source: Prequin, EurekaHedge, Author.

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Despite the pressure, LPs struggle to deploy capital

Difference between current and target allocations for median LP (in % point)

Type of limited partner	Private equity	Real estate	Infrastructure	Private debt	Natural resources
Endowment and foundation	2.0	2.5	2.8	2.0	2.1
Family office	2.0	0	1.9	3.5	-1.5
Insurance companies	1.0	4.3	1.8	2.0	4.7
Private-sector pension fund	1.0	3.5	2.1	3.0	3.1
Public pension fund	1.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	2.4
Sovereign-wealth fund	4.2	3.8	-0.8	0	-2.5
Superannuation scheme	0.9	1.6	1.0	0.5	N/A

Legend: ■ Underweight (blue), ■ Overweight (red)

- Allocations should be done over 5 to 7 years to:
 - Smooth vintage effects, build a coherent and viable portfolio
 - Use allocation brackets to exploit opportunities and absorb liquid assets' volatility
- Capital committed ≠ capital deployed, structurally
- ➔ Adopt a long term view and aim at reducing 'friction costs'



Note: median among LPs that report current allocation.
Source: McKinsey (2017).

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Private equity's black holes

The consequences of the herding effect




Less sophisticated investors build up risks (1/2)

A recurring lack of understanding of PE lead to herding and contagion effects

- **“Less relationships” + “save on fees”**: AuM breakdown of top private market operators

- Focus on “brands”, regardless expertise (failures: natural resources, hedge funds)
- Do not push GP to optimize returns:
 - Latent risk aversion from GPs (preserve track record)
 - Impact of fees not mitigated by LPs (fear of exclusion)
 - Co-investment pretense (‘lower fees’), but lack of knowledge of LPs (adverse selection, out of ‘sweet spot’)



- “Investment banking approach”: low value-add
 - ➔ currently changing as source of differentiation (LPs need to catch up... and some do)




Less sophisticated investors build up risks (2/2)

A recurring lack of understanding lead to herding and contagion effects

- **“Deploy more capital faster”:**

- Excessive focus on IRRs, possibly leading to further lack of alignment of interest (lines of credit)
- Detrimental pro-cyclical approach of PE
- Performance comes from the freedom attached to the mandate to GP to deploy capital wisely
- Fighting the tide when distributions are flowing back

Contributions from and distributions to LPs



Source: Preqin, McKinsey (2017).

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Consequences: some segments are overheating

As such, LBO is not overheating:

- Regular activity in small/mid market
- Funds raised = total invested (+ fees)


However, ‘shadow LBO’ adds up capacity:

- Correlation co-inv. / small & mid BO: 0.47
- Correlation co-inv. / large & mega BO: **0.79**


Large/mega BO exhibit an **excess** of capital:

- Dry powder = **4 years** of fund raising
- Potentially propping up valuations durably
- ➔ Possibly used for buy & build
- ➔ Possibly redirected to secondary LBO

1. Average LBO funds raised and invested (Europe, 2007-15)



2. Average LBO funds raised and invested (US, 2012-16)



Note: calculation of fees: 2% per year over 10 years.


Source 1: InvestEurope, PEREP, 2016; Wellershoff & Partners, 2017.

Source 2: Cambridge Associates/Private Equity Analyst/Axios, Pitchbook, Wellershoff & Partners, 2017.

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Two “black holes”: large LBO and secondaries (1/2)

Large & mega BO victim of its own success: the proof of valuations



- Competition from strategic investors, high valuations & limits to leverage → lower future returns
- “Easy to target”: LBO is the beginner’s play (co-investments) → expected to change



Source: Pitchbook (as of June 2016), Wellershoff & Partners, 2017.

Reduction in returns? For large/mega US LBO yes

“People used to expect 20% net IRRs or higher. Now investors are happy in the high to mid-teens, because the alternatives are so much less attractive”

D. Rubinstein (Carlyle Group), *Fortune*, “The Term Sheet”, 8/8/2012

“If you are wholly dependent on doing conventional buyouts, which today are very competitive with a lot of money around... frankly it’s going to be very difficult to generate traditional private equity returns in the low- to mid-20 percent (range)”

Leon Black (Apollo Global Management), quoted by G. Roumeliotis, “Private equity investors temper return expectations”, *Reuters*, 27/2/2013

“Blackstone considers a lower-return, longer-term approach to private equity”

W. Alden, *The New York Times*, 25/2/2015

“Private equity returns that had been an average of 15% are down to 12%, Mr. Rubenstein said: “I suspect that is where returns will stay”

A. Jacobius, “Private equity titans warn attendees to expect lower returns”, *Pensions & Investments*, 3/5/2016

Large & Mega LBO

- Large allocations have reduced information asymmetries and market imperfections
- Leverage is commoditized in DM, and now capped informally at 6 x EBITDA (USA)
- Relative standardization of investments (M&A approach and cost cutting)
- Need to innovate and develop new sources of value creation (less industrialised)
- Need to diversify into different investment areas




Note: quotes refer indiscriminately to gross IRR and net IRR.


Two “black holes”: large LBO and secondaries (2/2)

- Secondary market is getting riskier:
 - This is a tactical instrument
 - Attracts significant direct investments
 - Without discount, limited upside expected
 - The real value is in primary investments

1. Secondary fund raising and transaction



2. Evolution of secondary pricing



Source 1: Preqin, Greenhill, Wellershoff & Partners, 2017.
Source 2: Greenhill, 2017.


Private equity’s entropy: embrace the chaos

To succeed, dare to be different



Expected performance and actual performance of PE

Expected premium on public markets performance and actual DM (ex-US) PE IRR



S&P 500 returns over 20 years: 7.4% (5-Y: 10.6%) → Expected return: **10.5%** (13.7%)
 → Returns exceed long-term expectations, though short-term could create confusion



Note: expected performance is the weighted average of answers plus annual S&P performance over 5 and 20 years. CA returns are based on 818 developed markets PE funds ex-US (LBO, growth, venture, energy, mezzanine). Source: Preqin (2016), Cambridge Associates (2017, data as of June 2016), Wellershoff & Partners.

Embracing the chaos to succeed

To escape risks, investors have to embrace change

- Stasis = immobility while hidden risks abound = increased risk of losses
- “Know yourself” to define the constraints and optimize them
 - Balance portfolio between strategies, regions and vintage years
 - Leave some room for evolutions (opportunistic secondaries, denominator effect)
- To generate performance, be different:
 - Target smaller strategies and niches
 - Develop a differentiated strategy
 - Choose to be countercyclical
 - Invest in knowledge and expertise to back first-time funds
- Avoid uncompensated risks
 - Aim for mandates and segregated accounts (avoid contagion, define terms)
 - Do co-investment and direct only as co-lead with a clear expertise and value add




Invest in knowledge and expertise: first-time funds

First-time funds exhibit:


- Discipline and higher alignment of interest
 - Smaller funds require capital frugality
 - Need to develop a track record to raise further funds
 - Possibly friendlier terms for LPs
- Higher performance
 - 31% are top quartile, 23% second quartile
 - Need to differentiate and develop a track record
 - Higher motivation for carried interest
- Higher risks
 - Learning curve still there (operations)
 - Deal sourcing without brand tested
- More difficult to raise funds
 - 43% of LPs “will not invest” (vs 35% in 2011)
 - 40% will invest or in spin-off (vs 50% in 2011)



Av. fund size (USD mn)



First-time funds as proportion of PE fund raising




Source: Preqin, Pitchbook, Wellershoff & Partners, 2017.

Private equity’s third dimension: liquidity

Optimizing the constraints: risk-return-liquidity



The third dimension of private equity: liquidity



Source: Cambridge Associates (data as of 30/6/2016, published 12/2016), Wellershoff & Partners, 2017.

Private equity's entanglement: regulations

From red tape to opportunities?




Regulations are here to stay, and to increase?

So far, regulations were aimed at investors... this could change

- Upcoming measures could add up:
 - USA: carried interest treatment, deductibility of interests, tax overhaul
 - Europe: AIFMD 2, MiFid 2, EIOPA 2
- Increasing risk of backlash:
 - Botched turn-around (Sun Capital) and Chapter 11 abuses
 - Botched dividend recap (Bain Capital)

Total of employees in portfolio companies of top 5 LBO operators

➔ More than ESG will have to be done



Source: BCG, based on Pitchbook and Fortune's Global 500, 2017.

Conclusion



Conclusion

Some probable evolutions, others less obvious

PE market will continue to grow:

- LPs: focus on brand and large sizes → concentration and contagion risk
- Co-investments: 'there's no free lunch' → when the tide recedes, naked bathers will show
- This is a long-term gain: build conviction, avoid hype and stick to your guns

When the cycle clock will turn:

- Valuations will normalise → activity increase (once 'new normal' settles)
 - Some strategic buyers will sell (non strategic, overleveraged) → activity increase
- ... but when?

Unknown:

- Treatment of debt and interest for LBO (USA/Europe)?
- Perception of future LBO failures and restructuring? Backlash?



Thank you!

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